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such as the Melbourne Woolbrokers Association.  Highly successful in fostering 
competitive collaboration that improved market efficiency, the association rested on 
the social capital brought to it and further developed by the participants, individuals 
with extensive connections in the pastoral, banking and transport industries. The 
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This study explores the role of industry associations as facilitators and beneficiaries of 
social capital through an examination of the establishment and early operation of the 
Melbourne Woolbrokers Association [thereafter MWA]. The emergence of the MWA in 
March 1890 was contingent upon the progressive relocation of the market for Australian 
wool from London to cities within Australia.1 For the local market to compete with the 
old system of consignment to London, it had to offer additional benefits to the sellers, the 
local growers, and the buyers. Replacing the emergent local system of uncoordinated 
selling by individual brokers with a centralised point of sale operating with standardised 
rules and charges was critical to this process. Forming a new marketing institution 
required cooperation between broking firms that were also competitors. Moreover, 
transference of the physical market to Australia meant the weakening of social capital 
amongst those participating in the declining London market and required the creation of a 
bew set of relationships between actors in local networks to build social capital.  
From its inception, the MWA was an effective organisation. That this was so is surprising 
given the severity of the problems facing the pastoral industry and most of the member 
firms in the 1890s. Squeezed by falling revenues and heavy debt repayments, several 
firms within the MWA faced bankruptcy during its first decade, and two of the original 
members of the MWA were absorbed by rival firms. Such a potentially unstable group of 
members might be thought to be inimical to the development of trust and cooperation. 




revealed widespread corruption and dishonesty that touched many of those in the 
commercial and social circles in which members of the MWA moved. Relationships, 
personal and commercial, were re-evaluated as scandals came to light.  
How was the MWA able to develop high levels of trust and effective cooperation 
between its members in such a difficult environment? The MWA was embedded in time 
and place, an energetic outpost of Victorian Britain. Over the previous 40 years, the City 
of Melbourne and the Colony of Victoria had received an influx of British migrants, 
capital, ideas and institutions.
3
 They made up a society of joiners and participants, one 
with a strong associative capacity.
4
 The flourishing colony was quickly populated with 
formal associations of all sorts – religious, mutual benefit, sporting, cultural and social – 
each replete with constitutions, rules and mechanisms for dispute resolution. The MWA 
was established by men who were well acquainted with the construction and operation of 
institutions that served the common purpose of their members. They were bound together 
in the MWA by recognition of the need to create and maintain, under pressure from the 
wool buyers, a better system of wool marketing. Knowledge of what could be lost if the 
MWA broke down imposed a discipline on its participants. Social capital was built by 
iterative relations over time between the actors in this network. Put differently, what Lin 
called an ‘investment in social relations with expected returns in the market place’ [delete 
this comma] established reputation and trust among those engaged in building the 
MWA.5  
In its first decade the MWA evolved through two stages. Its formation was a defensive 
response to pressure from the newly organized wool buyers for a reduction in selling 
charges and improvements in the auction system. From 1890 until late 1892, the MWA 
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became a trade association whose principal concern was to negotiate an industry wide 
agreement on brokerage fees and charges. The Association achieved an agreement which 
was enforced through careful monitoring and a system of penalties for breaches. 
However, each member continued to operate as an independent selling agent. The second 
step began in late 1892 when the Association bowed to continued agitation from the 
buyers for a central auction room operating under its control. Assuming the central 
position within the wool market fundamentally altered the nature of the MWA. 
Cooperation amongst members was no longer focussed primarily on negotiating and 
enforcing a price agreement. Henceforth, the Association need to cooperate in the design 
and execution of a marketing process which offered efficiencies to all participants.  
Social capital theory provides a lens through which we can better understand the 
workings of the MWA and the means by which it created ‘economic rents’ for its 
members.6 This was an institution whose effectiveness resulted from a combination of 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties, and ‘closed’ and ‘open’ networks, applying concepts developed 
by sociologists that help in analyzing interactions within and between groups.
7
 Frequent 
face-to-face communication between a handful of individuals through the numerous 
committee meetings of the Association built strong ties. Following the work of James 
Coleman, we show that internally the MWA achieved high levels of closure within its 
network, and its cohesiveness fostered a high degree of trust and efficient 
communication, which in turn reduced the risk of opportunism and shirking.8 The strong 
inward or bonding ties were critical in building trust to help mediate inter-firm disputes. 
Moreover, strong ties facilitated the construction and acceptance of a binding set of rules 
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and regulations that ensured the governance of the Association and the efficiency of its 
oversight of wool marketing. 
Many of the individuals who represented their firms on the MWA had a multiplicity of 
roles beyond it. Many were themselves wool growers and stud masters, others sat on 
boards of non-pastoral related companies, some had been bankers before joining the 
pastoral companies. Business careers and membership of elite social clubs brought these 
men into contact men of influence in business, the state bureaucracy and politics. 
Knowledge gained in other networks informed the perspective and decision making 
within the MWA.  They were, to follow Ronald Burt, entrepreneurial ‘boundary 
spanners’, who could capture the value of an open network, where members span 
‘structural holes’ (gaps) in an array of social networks to access competitive resources 
otherwise unavailable to a cohesive closed group.9 These ties beyond the organisation 
may be ‘weak ties’, whose value Granovetter articulated; more important for Burt was the 
location advantage of an actor in the network, rather than the strength or weakness of a 
tie. Additional social capital for Burt can arise, therefore, ‘where people can broker 
connections between otherwise disconnected segments’ to access resources beyond the 
immediate network.
10
 The MWA strength was that it could draw on networks with 
varying degrees of openness and closure, from ties that looked inward and other ties that 
looked outward,  vesting a wealth of social capital in the MWA for the governance of the 
wool market. 
The paper will discuss the formation and operation of the MWA in the context of the 
changing strategic imperative in the 1880s and 1890s of the stock and station industry 
from which the brokers were drawn.11 The relocation of the wool market to Australia 
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increased the aggregate pool of commission income available in local markets. Firms 
could have chosen to engage in a price war to increase their market share as independent 
wool sellers. However, their directors chose to cooperate through the formation of the 
MWA. The third section provides a detailed account of the workings of the MWA, 
illustrating how it created and drew on its social capital to generate rents for its members. 
The paper then examines social capital creation along the supply chain, particularly the 
relationship between the MWA and the buyers association. The costs and benefits of 
association are then assessed. The conclusion briefly explores the impact of the MWA on 
the firms whose members it represented.  
Strategic Imperatives of the Stock and Station Agent Industry 
The formation of the MWA in 1890 coincided with a major change in the business model 
that stock and station agents had employed since the 1870s. For a generation the leading 
firms in the industry had been both bankers, playing a key role in financing the expansion 
of the pastoral industry, and commission agents. However, wool production was over 
extended by the late 1880s. Pastoralists, particularly in the newly settled drier regions, 
suffered the depredations of overgrazing, plagues of rabbits, and drought. Wool prices 
also fell. The stock and station agents faced many problems as a consequence: debtors 
defaulted, deposit and debenture holders withdrew their money, and credit became tighter 
in both London and in Australia, where a serious banking crisis occurred in 1893.
12
 
Survival became the order of the day. Three of the five original members of the MWA 
were forced to reach agreements with shareholders and creditors to ‘reconstruct’ their 
business: Goldsbrough Mort [GM] underwent three reconstructions in 1893, 1894-95 and 
1901;13 the New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency [NZL&MA] suspended in July of 
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1893, was re-registered in 1894 and its capital was written down in 1897;
14
 Australasian 
Mortgage and Agency [AMA] underwent a scheme of arrangement in 1894 before 
entering voluntary liquidation in 1903 and its wool selling business was acquired by the 
Australian Mortgage Land and Finance Company [AML&F], presaging that company’s 
entry into wool broking in Melbourne and Sydney.
15
 Another company, the Union 
Mortgage and Agency [UMA] was absorbed into Australian Estates [AE] in 1899 and its 
capital heavily written down.
16
 Only Dalgety came through unscathed. 
In this context, generating cash from the commission side of the business became a 
strategic imperative for the industry. If the bulk of Australian grown wool was to be sold 
locally, the formally independent selling brokers needed to cooperate to create, in the 
words of an authority on British commodity markets, Graham Rees, an ‘organised 
market’17 whose efficiency matched that of its major rival, London. From the 1840s when 
sales of wool commenced in Melbourne, until the formation of the MWA, local selling 
had suffered from several key defects. Each of the selling brokers ran auctions in its own 
premises and on its own terms. Despite many attempts to collude on prices, the brokers 
continued to compete. The ascendancy of the local market needed a central sale room and 
a uniform set of services offered by brokers, a common set of fees and charges, and 
dispute resolution arrangements for buyers and sellers. It was the buyers who pushed 
hardest for fundamental changes in the nature of the market, most notably for having a 
centralised sales room as existed in London.18 A Victorian Wool Buyers Association 
[VWBA] was formed in 1877,19 but it seems to have operated on an ad hoc basis before 






The Formation of Social Capital in the MWA 
The MWA
21
 was established in 1890, probably in response to a threat issued by buyers in 
October 1889 to boycott the next selling season.
22
 Its first recorded meeting was held on 
March 17 with senior members of all of the major Melbourne wool broking firms present, 
indicating the importance they attached to this new body.23 At the time of its creation a 
new opportunity was unfolding for wool growers and traders.  The opportunity to 
reposition themselves as local selling brokers needed careful thought by stock and station 
agents. Only the larger firms, whose colonial capital city offices and extensive reach into 
local country towns provided the necessary locational and supply chain resources, were 
candidates for wool broking on the scale necessary were local sales to overtake those in 
London. Achieving that end involved new collective investments in what business 
historian Alfred Chandler called ‘organisational capabilities’.24  New business 
relationships were required, particularly with an enlarged number of wool buyers with 
whom they would have ongoing exchange relationships. Among the wool broking firms 
themselves a new modus operandi was needed, one which would mute their intense 
rivalry and competition, and foster cooperation in the management and operation of 
regional wool auctions. Each of these considerations highlighted the need for a high trust, 
cooperative environment across the restructured supply chain for the wool trade. At the 
focal point of this chain stood the wool selling broker, who sought the cooperation of 
wool growers, local forwarding agents, and wool buyers. The MWA, like its sister 




Bonding Social Capital among the Brokers 
The formation of the MWA provided an opportunity to transform existing personal social 
capital into a synthetic or organisational form of social capital within it, which promised 
to expedite cooperative strategies where needed and instituted a form of trust not 
dependent upon the interaction of particular individuals.
25
 The membership of the MWA 
established a shared identity that fostered a commitment to the orderly marketing of 
wool. Individuals within the MWA acquired information and exercised influence, 
enhancing personal status and cementing bonds between erstwhile competitors. 
Organisationally, the MWA provided a ‘strategic network’ mechanism for inter-firm 
governance that set norms, rules, and processes for group competition and cooperation.
26
 
The MWA attenuated uncertainty and transaction costs within the wool market. However, 
the maintenance of the social capital created within the MWA was not without cost. 
Social capital resources here, as elsewhere, rested on what Bourdieu notes is ‘an 
unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is 
endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed.’27  
The MWA was an Association in little more than name when representatives of the 
biggest firms met. Taking the first step to form the Association relied on existing stocks 
of social capital. Ville and Merrett have drawn attention to the social networks and 
relationships that existed among the senior personnel of Melbourne wool broking firms 
by the interwar period.
28
 Similar connections existed in the late nineteenth century – the 
propinquity derived from common social background, education, networks, geographic 
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contiguity of workplace and residence, and industry experience.
29
 Many of the key 
individuals in the big stock and station agencies spanned roles, often simultaneously a 
wool grower, stud master, pastoral entrepreneur and financier.30 By 1890 the participants 
in the wool trade had a fair measure of each other’s worth, favorably or unfavorably, 
gleaned from decades of interaction in the spheres of business, club land, politics and 
family. 
The initial impetus to the formation of the MWA was pressure from the buyers for a 
central sale room and standardised conditions of sale. In turn, selling brokers feared that 
the recently united buyers would press for lower charges and commissions. The 
Association’s Rules and Regulations cited its principal objective being to ‘maintain 
uniformity of charges for selling wool…and for the protection of the interests of the 
members of the Association.’31 Minutes of the Association’s meetings in the first two 
years reveal that the main business was to get agreement about ending rebates offered to 
growers and negotiating with the buyers about the conduct of auctions. The Association 
continued to operate with a minimal set of formal rules. Until mid-1893, the constitution 
contained only six brief clauses which outlined the objectives of the Association, its 
membership, procedures for the admission of new members, voting rights, and 
meetings.
32
 During this early period, the frequent interaction of the members dealing with 
the many issues brought before them created a pool of knowledge about the practices of 
wool auctions and relations with all parties involved in a process that was still 
overwhelmingly tacit.  
The success of the Association was due to the high levels of commitment given by its 
member firms during its infancy. The first factor that strengthened the fledgling 
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Association was a realization amongst the member firms that cooperation was preferable 
to the alternative, a price war between independent selling brokers. Members firms, of 
whom most were under financial strain, opted for the certainty of the orderly marketing 
agreements presided over by the MWA. Moreover, the member firms recognized that any 
serious disruptions to the tightly synchronized timetable of sales within and between 
selling centres resulting from competition between selling brokers could deter the 
presence of foreign buyers. The London market, which still sold nearly a half of 
Australian wool through the 1890s,
33
  remained a serious threat. 
Commitment to the MWA was bolstered by an industrial dispute that became 
transformed into a conflict between labour and capital. The shearers’ strike of 1890, 
which spread to carriers, wharf labourers and marine officers, posed an immediate threat 
to pastoral industry. Those associated with it quickly organised as a political counter 
force, forming the powerful and influential Pastoralists’ Unions.34 Representatives of 
member firms of the MWA, such as F. E Stewart of GM and David Elder of NZL&MA, 
were leading lights in the Victorian Pastoralists’ Union. This political conflict with 
organised labour strengthened the bonds within the MWA. The MWA became more than 
a trade association; it became part of a broader struggle between capital and employers, 
against the threat of organised labour. In these circumstances, individuals representing 
their member firms committed emotionally and ideologically to the MWA. To do 
otherwise, or for their companies to withdraw, would have been seen as a political act of 
class treachery.  
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Bonding after the Opening of the Central Auction Room 
The decision taken by the MWA in late 1891 to operate a central auction room greatly 
increased the rents available to its member firms. Pressure from the VWBA continued 
from the beginning of the new 1891-92 season. The defection of one of the founding 
members, the NZL&MA, in June 1891 eventually forced the hand of the MWA. The 
remaining members urged the NZL&MA to consider the ‘drawbacks and dangers to all 
parties’ if it left.
35
 The Association continued to hold out against the buyers, its Minutes 
noting that the operation of central sales room was ‘beyond the limit of [its] functions.’
36
 
However, the threat of a buyer boycott of sales and the prospect of the VWBA dealing 
with NZL&MA while it operated outside the Association tipped the balance. By 
December the MWA had negotiated with the VWBA to find a venue, the Wool Exchange 
Building, satisfactory to both parties that would be available for the 1892-93 selling 
season. The NZL&MA returned to the fold.  
By early 1892, the MWA had finished a two-step process enabling it to serve as the 
governance structure for wool marketing. It had completed negotiations between its 
members to agree on a common set of fees and had taken charge of the auction process. 
The rules were tightened. A number of smaller selling brokers had their applications to 
join rejected or withdrew soon after being admitted.
37
 The Association had reached a 
point were it could withstand the shocks arising from the onset of the financial crisis in 
1893. As noted above, most of the member firms struggled to stave off bankruptcy and 
liquidation. Two of the smaller firms were ultimately absorbed into larger competitors. 
The Association continued to function effectively despite the heightened uncertainty 
surrounding its membership. For instance, GM and NZL&MA ceased trading for two 
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months from late June and early July pending their reconstructions.
38
 The financial 
problems arose from poor management of commercial risks rather than from the fraud 
and corruption that had tainted many businesses during the feverish boom of the late 
1880s and the onset of depression. John Horsfall, a director of GM, sailed close to the 
wind having been accused of embezzlement in 1889 and in 1894 improperly secured a 
loan of ₤10,000 for his son-in-law.
39
 David Elder, the Australian general manager of the 
NZL&MA, prepared accounts that a British judge declared had been ‘calculated to 
mislead.’
40
 However, these behaviours were the exception rather than the rule. There was 
no systemic loss of trust amongst the member firms or within the MWA.   
After the decision to operate a central sales room, the MWA became an institution with a 
more formal governance structure, the original six constitutional clauses increasing to 34. 
This was primarily because the operation of the auction room in the Wool Exchange 
Building required members to contribute funds towards its lease and refurbishment. 
Thereafter the Association expanded its rules regarding the financial obligations of its 
members and the responsibilities of those able to operate its bank account. Moreover, the 
new constitution outlined in more detail the rules of admission of new members and the 
processes for discipline of existing members. The rules explicitly outlawed members’ 
engaging in non-price competition, such as sponsoring local agricultural and pastoral 
societies or issuing market reports under their own names, as had occurred before the 
formation of the MWA.41  
This process of codifying conduct through rules and regulations turned the MWA into a 
third-party bridging organisation that was independent of the influence of any particular 
member firm. For instance, Clause 12 of the 1896 Rules and Regulations stated: ‘The 
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entire management of the Association and of all its affairs shall be in the absolute control 
of a Committee, to be formed of one representative or delegate of each member…’42 In 
effect, all the signatories accepted that the MWA would exercise a system of 
associational governance through a process of structured bargaining among members 
where equality within the institution was paramount. For instance, representation from 
each member company, voting rights, subscription fees and the posted loyalty bonds that 
might be forfeited in case of breach were equalised irrespective of the size or market 
share of members. Moreover, the office-holding positions, including chairman, rotated 
annually among member firms. 
Disputes between member firms were to be handled through transparent processes. There 
were penalties for breaches of the constitution in the form of escalating fines up to ₤500, 
and temporary suspensions distinguished the minor from the inveterate offender.  
However, there was in reality little recourse to these formal punishments. Members were 
reluctant to engage in behavior that might warrant serious conflict or expulsion. A 
willingness to forgive occasional transgressions while expelling more serious or repeating 
offenders helped to solidify the sense of trust among members and the recognition, by 
members and external parties alike, of the reputation signals membership conveyed. To 
prevent member firms introducing vexatious claims, the MWA modified its rules to 
require accusers to name suspect firms and to forfeit ₤10 if the charge was dismissed.
43
  
Moreover, voluntary resignation required six months notice, which provided an 
opportunity for reconsideration and reconciliation.44 Members sought recourse for 
violations of the rules and spirit of membership through deliberations by the general 
Committee of the MWA. For example, in 1896 GM accused two other members of 
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offering rebates to customers and guaranteeing prices. The charges were denied and after 
much deliberation the Committee chose to take no action.45  
The MWA became increasingly independent of the firms whose representatives sat on its 
committees. From the beginning the work of the Association was conducted through a 
series of committees, a general committee which included representatives of all member 
firms and a series of smaller ad hoc committees. The latter liaised with wool selling 
brokers in other colonies and related parties such as fellmongers, tanners and sheep skin 
buyers. In 1895, the MWA held its first Annual General Meeting and issued a report of 
its activities. From this time forward the constitution of the Association became more 
formal as the General Committee was supported by two permanent standing sub-
committees, one which participated in bi-annual conferences with the representatives 
from the VWBA and a Trade Committee that dealt with the routine marketing issues. 
Each member firm nominated three representatives able to attend on its behalf. 
Consequently, a sizeable contingent of senior staff from the member firms were involved 
in policy decisions designed to further the interests of the MWA rather than their 
employers. Moreover, while the constitution did not specify a meeting place from 1892 
gatherings were held in locations rented or owned by the MWA, reaffirming the separate 
status of the organisation. The incorporation of the Melbourne Wool Exchange Pty Ltd as 
the owner of the city wool auction rooms reinforced this independence in 1912.  
Management of the MWA and Social Capital Formation 
The social capital literature is replete with conjecture and evidence of the role of 
recurrent interaction through organisations as a stimulus to building trust and 
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cooperation, and in enhancing the capacity of an organisation to act in the interests of its 
constituents.46  The minutes of the MWA’s deliberations and, after August 1895, those of 
its Trade Committee permit a closer analysis of such interactions. Two conclusions are 
clear. MWA’s participation rates were extremely high, all the major companies sending a 
representative to each meeting, with provision for a substitute in the event of an absentee. 
Second, the minutes point towards an organisation that was highly interactive, 
participatory, and based on face-to-face communication, thereby fostering the building of 
trust and cooperation.  The almost complete absence of threats of resignation and an 
unwillingness to push divisive issues and minority viewpoints to the limit point to a 
culture of ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ within the organisation, rather than of ‘exit’ or ‘passivity’.  
The 1898 Annual Report explicitly noted that the MWA served as a ‘common meeting 
ground for amicable arrangement of small difficulties which might otherwise grow into 
grievances…and the resulting increase of uniformity in practice throughout the trade.’
47
  
Participation in the MWA generated rents for its members in a variety of forms. The 
Association was an effective mechanism for the reduction of opportunistic behaviour by 
any of the member firms. As noted above, there was little evidence of any serious or 
repeated breaches of agreements. The development of close ties within the MWA allowed 
highly effective monitoring, which imposed discipline upon its members. The prospect of 
expulsion from the Association, particularly after the establishment of a central auction 
room, was a credible threat as an outsider would have to bear the costs of running its own 
sales.  Moreover, the Association was able to reduce its members’ operating costs. 
Marketing costs, such as printing of sale catalogues, placing newspaper advertisements, 
publishing market reports, making donations to agricultural shows and societies, and 
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sending telegrams of sales results to London, which individual firms had previously 
borne, were undertaken by the MWA.48 Acting through the MWA, stock and station 
agents also used their collective bargaining power to achieve, for example, a reduction in 
fire insurance premiums and coastal shipping freight rates.
49
  While the provision of a 
central auction room involved additional outlays by member firms in the short term, there 
were considerable benefits arising from scale economies and tighter scheduling of sales.  
Social Capital and Rent Creation along the Supply Chain 
The growth of local auctions brought together wool brokers and buyers into new business 
relationships in Australia as each side embarked on new roles and responsibilities. Selling 
brokers and buyers transacted with each other daily across a wide range of functions, a 
situation susceptible to misunderstandings and disagreements in light of the new roles 
each had begun to play. These activities included how wool was to be displayed for 
inspection by the buyers, the bidding rules in the auction room, the responsibility for 
insurance, the terms under which the buyer could examine wool after purchase, charges 
for unsold wool still in store, the length of the prompt period from sale to clearance on 
board ship and so on.50  The challenges of managing these responsibilities and forging 
new relationships were exacerbated by the pressures exerted from the rapid growth of the 
wool market.
51
 Any protracted delays due to disputes would have had a major impact on 
the efficiency of the market by creating upstream logjams in the supply chain.   
Industry associations of buyers (the VWBA) and brokers (the MWA) provided 
mechanisms for inter-organisational communication and the negotiation of industry-wide 
solutions. From its earliest days, the MWA was in regular contact with the VWBA. 
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However, the degree of commercial and social propinquity amongst the buyers was less 
evident than among the broking firms. The VWBA’s members included representatives 
from many countries, including the USA, France, Belgium and Japan. Therefore, building 
trust and cooperation between the two groups in the form of synthetic social capital that 
reinforced and promoted productive personal relationships was critical, the foundations of 
which were iterative communications between participants in the industry.  
These associations mediated disputes and mitigated their recurrence by establishing 
greater certainty and standardisation of wool market procedures and practices. When the 
VWBA was formed, matters of immediate concern to the buyers were discrepancies in 
bale weights and the terms concerning discount for prompt payment.
52
 Face-to-face 
contact between small groups of representatives whose negotiating position was set by 
their respective Associations provided a process for conflict resolution. The ongoing 
dialogue between the key participants in the wool market created an understanding of the   
‘rules of the game’ that helped build trust and respect. From their very early days the 
MWA and VWBA held joint semi-annual conferences, at the start and end of the selling 
season, to discuss and resolve differences, and to find ways of improving the supply 
chain’s efficiency.  On day-to-day matters, a standing subcommittee with three 
representatives from each association was established in 1899.
53
 These forms of repeated 
interaction built social capital. In March 1895 the MWA noted that relations with the 
VWBA were ‘most friendly’ and specifically noted that the relationship promised ‘to 
remove all fear of disagreement in the future as well as to introduce desirable 
improvements in the conduct of business.’
54
  In 1906 the VWBA wrote to MWA 
congratulating them on the outcome of the recent conference between the two 
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associations, which resolved a ‘somewhat knotty problem’, a heated disagreement 
initiated by the buyers about the number of sale days in Melbourne. Differences flared 
from time to time on particular issues,55 but these were resolved through a well 
recognised process of negotiation. Intense diplomacy, punctuated by cricket matches and 




Costs and Benefits of Association 
The Melbourne-based wool brokers enjoyed commercial advantages from their 
participation in the MWA in the first decades after its establishment. Collective action 
protected revenues from price cutting and reduced marketing expenditures. More 
importantly, the selling brokers devised a system of centralised auction in close 
collaboration with wool buyers that cemented the ascendancy of Australia as a marketing 
centre for wool. Also on the benefits side, industry-specific knowledge of individuals 
who were members of the MWA and their parent firms was shared, recombined and 
translated into action through the network of actors within the MWA. The Association 
recognised that it possessed a stock of knowledge about wool marketing that was greater 
than that of any of the constituent firms. For instance, to protect the tacit knowledge 
acquired through years of experience the Association and the companies would permit 
men who represented one firm to represent another if they changed employer. For 
instance, F. E. Stewart represented GM and then Younghusband on the MWA.
57
 
On the cost side of the ledger, the financial investments that underpinned the MWA, its 
premises, a secretary, personnel at the auction, and an advertising budget were modest 
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compared with the balance sheets and cash flows of the participating firms. The principle 
cost was the time commitment of senior executives from the member firms. However, 
this cost was minimized by a number of factors. Meetings were held only when 
‘considered necessary by the Chairman’
58
 until 1896 and then ‘once a fortnight, or at such 
other times as it shall appoint to consider any business’ thereafter.
59
 Member firms could 
rotate their three representatives across meetings as the need arose. The MWA could 
function with a quorum of representatives of only three firms so decisions could be taken 
with some absentees. Geographic propinquity further reduced the amount of time 
committed to meetings; all of the individuals who needed to attend had offices within 
walking distance of the meeting place.60  
Two distinct types of rent generation, based on the previously mentioned work of James 
Coleman and Ronald Burt, were embedded in the MWA and shared through social capital 
mechanisms. The first, ‘Coleman rents’, derives from his analysis of the gains from a 
dense network of strong ties that bind members into a cohesive group.
61
 This concept of 
strong ties can be seen in the work done by the Association to structure the rules for wool 
marketing. Much of the early activity of the MWA prior to the establishment of the 
central auction room sought to reach inter-firm agreements on charges. Thereafter, the 
focus switched to establishing rules and procedures that provided the institutional 
architecture for the market. The records of the Association show a high level of frequency 
of meetings and discussion between company representatives. The individuals 
representing member firms drew on their industry experience, which they shared to create 
organisational knowledge within the MWA about the operations of the wool market. The 
social capital forged through this type of association results from the tightness and 
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cohesion of the group, which, in turn, fosters a high degree of trust and efficient 
communication. The formation and evolution of the MWA expanded the breadth and 
depth of social capital shared amongst the participants in Melbourne’s wool market.  
One example of the pay offs to members from these strong ties was the renegotiated 
pricing structure introduced in July 1896. Previously, the Association bound its members 
to impose a wide range of charges on sellers. They included a commission fee set at a 
percentage of the price received for each bale sold with a discount for larger clips, and a 
volume-based receiving charge which covered the warehousing, weighing, lotting, 
repacking of sample bales, fire insurance, and advertising costs for wool. From 1896, 
however, the sundry charges for handling wool were combined into a single and reduced 
fee of ⅛ penny per pound. This shift had a number of beneficial effects. It reduced the 
transaction costs of computing a range of volume-based charges. It also more closely 
aligned charges with actual costs by providing lower charges for the larger clips where 
scale economies in selling existed.  
The second form of gains that the MWA fostered, ‘Burt rents’62, derived from what 
Ronald Burt described as the benefits of spanning structural holes between networks by 
exploiting loose ties. As found here, Burt rents arose from the capacity of the MWA to 
engage with outside parties along the value chain, with growers, buyers, bankers, 
shippers, insurers, railway commissioners and the like, and with groups of wool brokers 
in other regions. The social capital—the knowledge, contacts, and shared expectations—
created and deployed between networks was a product of the ability of representatives of 
member firms to span structural holes or gaps in the network. Social capital arose from 
the MWA having representatives who were positioned to span gaps and connect with 
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other networks, forming and cementing ties with disparate parties and tapping new 
knowledge, thereby creating wider pools of resources of strategic value in the market for 
the MWA.63  
The membership of the MWA generated both Coleman and Burt rents because it could 
leverage gains from ‘strong’ ties, from ‘weak’ ties, and from the ‘boundary-spanning’ 
activities. MWA founders seem to have deliberately shaped the organization to promote 
networking in multiple directions and on multiple levels, although they would not have 
used the term then.  The constitution required each member firm to nominate three 
representatives whose diverse roles assured depth and reach into the trade. These 
representatives were drawn from directors and executives, the general managers of the 
companies, and second tier men such as the Melbourne manager, the pastoral manager, 
station inspector or the wool and produce manager.  
The general managers and directors of member firms of the MWA were those with the 
contacts to reach out beyond the day-to-day workings of the Association. They provided 
the resources that came from ‘weak ties’ to multiple distant parties; their social 
prominence especially allowed them to ‘broker’ connections with prominent persons in 
other networks. The most important ‘weak tie’ was between the MWA and the networks 
of the top men in the member firms. The business interests of the directors of the stock 
and station agents sitting on the MWA extended to other colonies, New Zealand and, 
particularly through the London boards of Dalgety, NZL&MA and AE into the heart of 
Anglo-Australasian commerce.
64




 of the AMA were 
pioneer pastoralists, sheep breeders and wool growers, who brought a lifetime of 




 of GM were directors of local banks and insurance companies, mining, 
distilling, frozen meat works and woollen mills. These men reached out to organisations 
such as local government and the colonial legislature, the Anglican and Presbyterian 
churches, the Farmers Club, the National Agricultural Society and Pastoralists’ 
Associations. Like many others who enjoyed commercial success and social standing, 
they were members of the elite Australian and Melbourne Clubs.  Fisken, for instance, 
was president of the latter in 1901.
68
 In short, representatives with multiple business 
interests were tied into a number of interconnected and interlocking spheres, within 
Melbourne, in other Australian colonies, New Zealand and in London.   
The company managers who were representatives on the MWA generated most of the 
‘strong ties’ through their detailed knowledge of the operation of wool sales in 
Melbourne and London. A few of the managers had broader experience such as Stewart 
and Cooper of GM and Edmond Young and J. J. Falconer, long serving general managers 
of AML&F who had been career bankers.
69
 However, once the MWA became the key 
rule-making body structuring the auction market in Melbourne, the value of their 
knowledge about pastoral lending was joined to the newly created knowledge about 
marketing. Managers of the wool and produce departments rose in importance compared 
to once highly influential station inspectors. Their social capital was at the heart of the 
operational resources that sustained the MWA centralised auction rooms.  
Conclusion 
The MWA’s early history demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between the existence 
of social capital and institutional effectiveness. Extant personal social capital, forged 
 23 
through commercial and social interaction amongst the participants in the Melbourne 
wool trade, was a necessary pre-condition to the formation of the MWA. Previously 
cultivated levels of respect, trust and reputation enabled competitors to put their 
differences aside in pursuit of a common aim: a set of uniform fees for wool broking and, 
after the establishment of a central auction room in 1892, setting standards and rules to 
increase efficiency and transparency in the market. The workings of the MWA, with its 
frequent meetings between members, and with buyers and selling brokers in other 
centres, created a wider and deeper pool of social capital, that was synthetic and 
organisational in nature and that reinforced and encouraged the personal. Individual 
knowledge residing within the MWA became codified and organisational knowledge 
over time as decisions were committed to paper in the form of amendments to the 
constitution, the publication of annual reports, and the minutes of meetings and 
conferences.  
In so doing, the social capital of the MWA reached back into the workings of the pastoral 
firms that had created it. The MWA and its Trade Committee became the loci of decision 
making about matters of vital commercial importance to its members. Companies were 
bound by decisions made by an autonomous body that practised collective decision 
making with each member firm having an equal voice and taking a turn as the 
chairmanship rotated. Member firms delegated authority to a body whose actions might 
not always coincide with their best interests. The MWA generated a dynamic cohesion 
that shaped behaviours within its constituent firms rather than being a simple forum for 
companies to air their views. It presaged industry-wide bodies that were created to act on 
the other key issues affecting its interests, particularly the acquisition and sale of 
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Australian wool by the government during the First World War.
70
 Members of the MWA, 
such as George Aitken, were prominent in the creation and operation of these industry 
bodies, whose success might have been uncertain if not for the experience of social 
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